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GRIFFIN, J.
In this defamation case, Christopher Comins [“Comins”], appeals a trial court
order entering partial final judgment in favor of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Matthew
VanVoorhis [“VanVoorhis”], for Comins’s failure to comply with the presuit notice

requirement of section 770.01, Florida Statutes (2008). Comins argues that the trial
court erred because VanVoorhis is not a “media defendant” and thus is not entitled to
presuit notice.

Alternatively, Comins contends that, even if VanVoorhis had been

entitled to presuit notice, VanVoorhis waived that right by his efforts to remain
anonymous.1 We affirm.
This case arises out of a May 19, 2008 incident that involved Comins. According
to various reports prepared by the Orange County Sheriff’s Office, at around 4:30 p.m.,
people began to notify authorities that two wolves or dogs were in a pasture with cattle
located near the intersection of State Road 417 and Narcoosee Road. Over the next
two hours, the Orange County Sheriff’s Office Communications Center received multiple
calls. Some witnesses believed, at first, that the dogs were wolves; other witnesses
stated that they knew the dogs were domestic animals because the dogs had collars.
Witnesses reported observing the dogs circling and cornering the cattle, including a
young calf. Some witnesses believed the dogs were just playing; others thought the
dogs were acting in an aggressive manner. Eventually, reports came in that a man had
shot the dogs. Twenty people were listed as witnesses to the shooting.
Comins, who is friends with the landowner, was driving past the pasture as these
events were unfolding, and called to alert the landowner of the situation. According to
Comins and the landowner, the landowner told Comins that animals attacking the cattle
should be shot. Comins said he went into the pasture, was confronted by the dogs, felt
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In his cross-appeal, VanVoorhis appeals a trial court order denying his motion
for sanctions under the trial court’s inherent authority and under section 57.105, Florida
Statutes (2011) [the “57.105 motion”]. VanVoorhis argues that the trial court erred by
denying the 57.105 motion because Comins’s counsel misrepresented to the court that
presuit notice under section 770.01 had been given. We affirm the cross-appeal without
further comment.
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threatened, and shot at the dogs six times. The following narrative was prepared by the
Orange County Sheriff’s Office in their investigative findings:
After the sixth shot at the dogs, an unknown man (later
identified as Christopher Butler [the dogs’ owner]) to Comins
ran into the pasture to protect and/or take control of the
dogs. Statements indicate that Butler was yelling that the
dogs were his though Comins said he was not aware that he
was the actual owner nor did Comins hear Butler.
Comins looked at this person (Butler) while Butler was
moving to cover one of the dogs. Comins then turned
around and fired the seventh and final shot at the second
dog.
Comins had turned his back on the second dog, placed his
gun into his right back pocket and walked eleven steps away
from this dog. He then turns around, pulls his gun and fires
the seventh shot when the dog attempts to stand up as
indicated in the original video.
Where Butler is physically in control of the first dog and the
second dog is having difficulty standing or moving far, the
need to continue shooting the second dog to protect the
cattle is no longer required.
Turning around to shoot the second dog behind Comins’
back while Butler was present was unnecessary per Florida
State Statute 828.12 [Cruelty to Animals].
Local news outlets, such as the Orlando Sentinel, WKMG Local 6, WESH
Channel 2, and WFTV Channel 9, reported on the incident. Then, in early June 2008, a
witness to the incident, who had caught the shooting on camera, posted the video of the
shooting onto YouTube. Throughout the summer, the incident continued to be reported
in the news. Thousands of people signed an online petition, entitled “Justice for Husky
Dogs Shot in Orange County, Florida,” demanding that Comins be charged with animal
cruelty. Eventually, in late July, Comins was charged with one count of misdemeanor
animal cruelty.

3

VanVoorhis learned about the incident from a Facebook group that had been
created to express outrage over the incident. At this time, VanVoorhis had a bachelor’s
degree in sociology from Indiana University, a master’s degree in sociology from the
University of Florida, and was working towards his doctoral degree in sociology at the
University of Florida. Since 2007, VanVoorhis had maintained a blog, entitled “Public
Intellectual,” using the online blog platform, WordPress.2

He ran the blog under a

pseudonym, M. Frederick Voorhees (his full legal name being Matthew Frederick
VanVoorhis). VanVoorhis testified in his deposition that he founded the blog in order to
“publicly comment on issues of public concern in an intellectual manner without tying my
comments to my professional identity.”3

VanVoorhis testified that he went by a

pseudonym to protect his identity because, while a student, he wrote critiques of
academia as an institution and its ability to connect with the public. Relying on the
video itself and the online news articles reporting the incident, VanVoorhis published the
blog posts at issue in this case.
Sometime in early 2009, Comins became aware of VanVoorhis’s blog posts.
Comins traced the blog posts to the University of Florida’s computer network and,
subsequently, through counsel, sent a letter [the "Killgore letter"] to “M. Frederick
Voorhees” c/o the University of Florida on March 23, 2009. In this letter, Comins’s
attorney, Frank H. Killgore, Jr. [“Attorney Killgore”], expressed concern over several
2

WordPress is a free blog and web hosting service. en.wordpress.com/tos/.
VanVoorhis’s blog can be located at www.publicintellectual.wordpress.com.
3

VanVoorhis also testified in his deposition that “Public Intellectual” had won
“The Thinking Blogger Award” (a weekly blogger award given to a thoughtful blog post)
for an article, entitled The McDonaldization of Citizenship. VanVoorhis testified that the
article applied a theory from George Ritzer’s book “The McDonaldization of Society” to
the idea of citizenship, and what it means to be an active citizen in the United States.
4

death threats that individuals had made in the blog’s comments section and over the
fact that Comins’s personal and business contact information had been posted in the
comments section. Attorney Killgore requested that VanVoorhis delete the blog in its
entirety or, at least, remove the death threats and all references to Comins’s contact
information.4 Comins then reported the blog post to the University of Florida Police
Department, which contacted VanVoorhis about Comins’s complaint.
Eventually, Comins obtained VanVoorhis’s full legal name and address. On May
13, 2009, Comins filed a four-count complaint against VanVoorhis for libel (Count I),
libel per se (Count II), defamation by implication (Count III), and tortious interference
with a business relationship (Count IV). Thereafter, VanVoorhis filed a counterclaim
against Comins for abuse of process and filed an answer and asserted eleven
affirmative defenses to Comins’s complaint.

At issue here is VanVoorhis’s fifth

affirmative defense that Comins failed to comply with the presuit notice requirement of
section 770.01 before filing the complaint against him. Section 770.01 provides:
Before any civil action is brought for publication or
broadcast, in a newspaper, periodical, or other medium, of a
libel or slander, the plaintiff shall, at least 5 days before
instituting such action, serve notice in writing on the
defendant, specifying the article or broadcast and the
statements therein which he or she alleges to be false and
defamatory.
§ 770.01, Fla. Stat. (2008). VanVoorhis also filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit on this
same basis. On September 10, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to
dismiss. Comins’s counsel, Christopher M. Harne [“Attorney Harne”], told the trial court
that presuit notice had been sent. Based on this representation, the trial court granted
4

Comins contends that the Killgore letter was sufficient to meet the requirements
of section 770.01, Florida Statutes; however, this letter fails in its essential function to
notify the defendant that the article was false and defamatory.
5

VanVoorhis’s motion to dismiss, but gave Comins leave to amend his complaint to
properly plead compliance with the presuit notice requirement.
Comins’s first amended complaint alleged that “Plaintiff complied with Fla. Stat. §
770.01 in an abundance of caution by serving notice in writing on Defendant care of the
University of Florida on March 23, 2009, identifying the articles which Plaintiff alleges to
be false and defamatory.” Later, Comins filed a second amended complaint, which
amended the presuit notice allegation to read:
Defendant is not a media defendant, and therefore Plaintiff
was not required to provide him with pre-suit notice before
instituting this action. However, even if this Court finds
Defendant was entitled to pre-suit notice, which Plaintiff
denies, Plaintiff has either satisfied all conditions precedent
to bringing this lawsuit or such conditions have been waived
or excused by Defendant’s conduct.
On March 1, 2011, VanVoorhis filed a motion for summary judgment on the
presuit notice issue. The trial court held a hearing on VanVoorhis’s motion for summary
judgment and ruled in favor of VanVoorhis based on Comins’s failure to comply with the
presuit notice requirement of section 770.01. The trial court said that “[t]he issue, then,
is whether or a [sic] not Defendant’s blog falls under the rubric of ‘other medium’ as
used in section 770.01.” Finding that “other medium” does include the internet, the trial
court held that Comins was required to give VanVoorhis presuit notice under section
770.01. The trial court also rejected Comins’s waiver argument as having no factual or
legal basis. We agree.5

5

The record shows that it was not very difficult to find and to communicate with
VanVoorhis. Failing any other alternative, Comins could have posted a retraction notice
in the comments section of VanVoorhis’s blog. We approve the trial court’s conclusion
as to waiver without further comment.
6

On appeal, Comins argues that the trial court erred by ruling that Comins’s failure
to comply with the presuit notice requirement of section 770.01 barred his claims
because the section only applies to a “media defendant” and VanVoorhis is not a
“media defendant.”
Although the express language of section 770.01 does not limit the type of
defendant entitled to presuit notice, “[e]very Florida court that has considered the
question has concluded that the presuit notice requirement applies only to ‘media
defendants,’ not to private individuals.” Zelinka v. Americare Healthscan, Inc., 763 So.
2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
The "media defendant" issue arises because of certain language appearing in
prior decisions of the Florida Supreme Court. In Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So.
2d 1098, 1112 (Fla. 2008), the court commented that “[u]nder Florida’s defamation law,
a prospective plaintiff is required to give a media defendant notice five days before
initiating a civil action.” However, this language does not necessarily mean that only
media defendants are entitled to presuit notice under section 770.01.6 The line of cases
imposing the “media defendant” requirement rely mainly on the Florida Supreme Court’s
much earlier opinion in Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950).
Section 770.01 was originally enacted in 1933 and, until 1976, applied only to
actions brought for publication of a libel in a newspaper or periodical:
6

Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court has held that section 770.07, which
establishes the point in time when a cause of action for defamation accrues, applies to
both media and private individual defendants. Wagner, Nugent v. Flanagan, 629 So. 2d
113, 115 (Fla. 1993). The Wagner court acknowledged that chapter 770 primarily
addresses media defendants, but the court pointed out that the chapter is broadly titled
“Civil Actions for Libel” and that limiting section 770.07 to media defendants only “would
allow potentially endless liability since Florida Statutes contains no statute of repose for
this particular tort.” Id.
7

Before any civil action is brought for publication, in a
newspaper or periodical, of a libel, the plaintiff shall, at least
five days before instituting such action, serve notice in
writing on defendant, specifying the article, and the
statements therein, which he alleges to be false and
defamatory.
§ 770.01, Fla. Stat. (1950) (emphasis added). In Ross v. Gore, the Florida Supreme
Court explained that one of the objectives of the Legislature when originally enacting the
statute was to “afford to newspapers and periodicals an opportunity in every case to
make a full and fair retraction in mitigation of the damages which a person may have
suffered by reason of the publication.” 48 So. 2d at 415. The issue in Ross was the
constitutionality of section 770.01. One of the arguments advanced by the appellant
was that the statute violated the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution
because it “grants a special privilege to newspapers and periodicals . . . . " Id. at 414.
In response to this argument, the Ross court discussed the purpose of granting
newspapers and periodicals such “special privilege”:
The provision for retraction is peculiarly appropriate to
newspapers and periodicals, as distinguished from private
persons. There is a valid difference in the classes, in this
respect, which is sufficient to sustain the validity of the
provision under the ‘equal protection’ clause.
Id.
Another argument advanced by the Ross appellants was that, in the absence of
notice and a retraction, their suit for defamation should not have been dismissed but,
rather, should have been limited to actual damages. According to the appellants, to
construe the section as a condition precedent would be unconstitutional. Id. at 415. In
response to this argument, the court held that the clear language of the statute
established that notice was a condition precedent to suit. Id. The court reasoned that
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construing the statute otherwise would “defeat what must have been one of the
objectives of the Legislature in enacting the statute.” Id. The court explained that the
purpose of section 770.01 was “also to afford to newspapers and periodicals an
opportunity in every case to make a full and fair retraction in mitigation of the damages
which a person may have suffered by reason of the publication. This objective is a
salutary one, and we do not think it constitutes unjust discrimination in favor of
newspapers and periodicals.” Id.
The discussion in Ross focused on the rationale for granting newspapers and
periodicals the right to retraction. First, the court emphasized that “[t]he public has an
interest in the free dissemination of news.” Id. The court stated:
In the free dissemination of news, then, and fair comment
thereon, hundreds and thousands of news items and articles
are published daily and weekly in our newspapers and
periodicals. This court judicially knows that it frequently
takes a legal tribunal months of diligent searching to
determine the facts of a controversial situation. When it is
recalled that a reporter is expected to determine such facts
in a matter of hours or minutes, it is only reasonable to
expect that occasional errors will be made. Yet, since the
preservation of our American democracy depends upon the
public’s receiving information speedily—particularly upon
getting news of pending matters while there still is time for
public opinion to form and be felt—it is vital that no
unreasonable restraints be placed upon the working news
reporter or the editorial writer.
Id. In other words, the Ross court determined that it is necessary in a democracy for
the people to have speedy access to fact reporting and editorial comment. The Ross
court was especially concerned that removing the safeguards of section 770.01 would
result in a press that is “so inhibited that its great and necessary function of policing our
society through reporting its events and by analytical criticism would be seriously
impaired.” Id. at 415.7
9

In 1976, section 770.01 was amended to apply to actions brought for publication
or broadcast of a libel or slander in a newspaper, periodical, or other medium. Perhaps
the Legislature enacted this amendment to expand the protection of the section to
include only radio and television broadcasts. Indeed, at that time, other sections of
chapter 770 were amended to include explicit references to radio and television
broadcasts. However, the amended language of section 770.01 was not so specific.
In Laney v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 910 (S.D. Fla. 1982),
Judge King had to decide whether section 770.01 applied to protect the author of an
allegedly defamatory letter to the editor that was published by Knight-Ridder
Newspapers. The plaintiff in the case had not complied with the section’s presuit notice
requirement as to the letter’s author, but argued that the requirement did not apply to
nonmedia defendants. Id. at 912.
Judge King observed that:
[T]he provision fails to specify that notice need be provided
only to media-defendants. If the legislature did intend to so
limit the applicability of this provision, it seems logical that a
specific restriction would have been inserted into the statute.
One may reasonably infer from the generality of the
language, therefore, that the statute requires notice to all
potential defendants in an action for libel or slander.”
Id. Moreover, Judge King found that “it would be grossly unfair to construe the statute
in such a way as to deny non-media defendants the opportunity to mitigate actual
damages or avoid the assessment of punitive damages.” Id. at 913. This is so because
“[n]otice affords defendants the opportunity to issue a retraction or even to settle the
overall conflict, thereby mitigating damages or eliminating litigation altogether. At the

7

The Ross court observed that it was the Legislature’s prerogative whether to
include radio broadcasting stations within the terms of the statute. Id. at 414.
10

very least, notice may afford a non-media defendant the chance to consult with an
attorney about legal matters with which (s)he may be extremely unfamiliar.” Id.
In this ruling, Judge King acknowledged that the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision in Ross “provides perhaps the strongest support for plaintiff’s position.”
However, Judge King stated that, “[w]hile the [Ross court] indirectly referred to the
statute’s applicability in terms of newspapers and periodicals, it did not specifically
describe the parameters of the statute’s applicability, nor, for that matter, provide
sufficient justification for its decisions to discuss applicability solely in terms of
newspapers and periodicals.” Id. at 912. Rather, “[t]he [Ross court] may very well have
discussed the applicability of the statute in these terms simply because the defendants
in the case were media-defendants.” Id. at 912 n.6.
Judge King’s reasoning has since been rejected by other courts addressing this
issue. In Bridges v. Williamson, 449 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), the Second
District noted that the Ross court construed 770.01 “to apply exclusively to suits against
newspapers and periodicals, as distinguished from private individuals.”

Id. at 401.

When section 770.01 was later amended, “the legislature was aware of Ross since it is
presumed to be cognizant of the judicial construction of a statute when contemplating
changes in the statute.” Id. (citing Seddon v. Harpster, 403 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1981)).
Thus, “[h]ad the legislature intended to extend the application of the statute to nonmedia
defendants, it could have inserted such a provision into the statute at that time.” Id.
Rather, “[t]he language of the statute is limited to newspapers, periodicals, and other
media. Nowhere does the statute contain the words ‘nonmedia’ or ‘private individuals.’”
Id.
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A week after the Bridges opinion was published, the Third District published its
opinion in Davies v. Bossert, 449 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), in which it also held
that section 770.01 applies only to media defendants.

In Davies, the court was

confronted with whether the plaintiff was required to follow the 770.01 presuit notice
requirement before filing suit for slander over “allegedly defamatory statements made by
a private citizen [about a lobster fisherman he believed was stealing lobster from the
nets of other fishermen] over an emergency channel of a citizen’s band radio.” Id. at
419. The Davies court held that this non-media defendant was not entitled to presuit
notice under section 770.01. Id. at 421. Disapproving of Judge King’s ruling in Laney,
the Davies court stated:
Although the issue before the Florida Supreme Court in
Ross was different, the court unavoidably recognized that
the statute had no application to non-media defendants. The
main issue in Ross was whether the statute was
discriminatory in that it permitted media defendants to avoid
punitive damages by publishing a retraction or apology for
libelous statements while not affording the same privilege to
non-media defendants. The court did not hold, as does
Laney, that section 770.01 applies to media and non-media
libelees alike, but recognized that the unambiguous
language of the statutory condition precedent applies only to
media defendants. Ross, 48 So. 2d at 414-15.
Id. at 420. Then, the Davies court examined the 1976 revision of the statute:
The earlier version of section 770.01, which was construed
in Ross v. Gore, referred only to publication of a libel in a
newspaper or periodical. In 1976, the statute was amended
to include reference to (1) “broadcast” (in addition to
“publication”), (2) “other medium” (in addition to “newspaper
and periodical”), and (3) “slander” (in addition to “libel”). Ch.
76-123, § 1, Laws of Fla. The following additions were also
made to Section 770.02: “or broadcast station” in the
section’s heading; “or broadcast” (as an addition to “article”);
and a reference to correction, apology, or retraction in the
case of a broadcast. Section 770.03 was also amended so
as to refer to broadcasting stations in general and not just to
12

radio broadcasting stations.
Section 770.04 refers
specifically to the civil liability of an “owner, licensee, or
operator of a radio or television broadcasting station, and the
agents, or employees of any such owner, licensee or
operator.”
Since no other section of Chapter 770 uses the language
“other medium” as found in section 770.01, we can infer
reasonably that the legislature intended that term to include
television and radio broadcasting stations. There is no
logical reason to suppose that section 770.01 contemplates
any form of medium not covered by other sections of the
chapter. In the absence of legislative history, we can look to
earlier enactments and other sections of the present Chapter
770 to determine the intent and meaning of the words “or
other medium” in section 770.01. See Florida State Racing
Commission v. McLaughlin, 102 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1958) (if
part of a statute appears to have a clear meaning if
considered alone but when given that meaning is
inconsistent with other parts of the same statute or others in
pari material, the court will examine the entire act and those
in pari material in order to ascertain the overall legislative
intent); Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 593 P.2d 777, 791
(1979) (in determining whether Oregon’s retraction statute’s
reference to “publisher” was limited to a media entity, court
looked to other provisions of the statute).
Id.; see also Gifford v. Bruckner, 565 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (citing to Davies
for the proposition that “other medium” includes only television and radio broadcasters).
The Davies court’s rationale was implicitly rejected in Nelson v. Associated
Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D. Fla. 1987). In Nelson, the plaintiff relied on Davies
and Bridges to argue that section 770.01 did not apply to dispatches transmitted by the
Associated Press over their wire service.

Id. at 1473-74.

Rejecting the plaintiff’s

argument, Judge Spellman ruled that the language “other medium” should be read
broadly to include wire services like the AP.
In Mancini v. Personalized Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 702 So. 2d 1376
(Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the plaintiff had successfully argued to the trial court that section
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770.01 did not apply to the defendant in the case. On appeal, the court rejected the
plaintiff’s argument:
To the extent [plaintiff’s] argument is based on the fact that
defendant is a full-time assistant state attorney as well as a
part-time columnist, we discern no logical distinction
between defendant and any other columnist. To the extent
that plaintiff asserts that the statute is applicable only to
actions against the newspaper itself, as opposed to the
individuals writing for the newspaper, this restrictive
interpretation of section 770.01 is not supported by the
language of the statute.
Id. at 1378.
The Mancini opinion mainly concerns the plaintiff’s argument that section 770.01
applies only to actions against the newspaper itself.

Rejecting this argument, the

Mancini court held that interpreting Ross to exclude reporters, editorial writers, and
columnists from the protection of 770.01 would be “contrary not only to the plain
language of the statute, but to the legislative intent of the statute as expressed in Ross.”
Id. The court further stated, “There is nothing in Ross to indicate that in using the term
‘newspaper’ our supreme court was referring only to the entity as distinguished from the
individual columnists, reporters and editorial writers who write for the newspaper.” Id.
Rather, the Mancini court observed that Ross emphasized that it is vital that no
unreasonable restraints be placed upon the working news reporter or the editorial writer.
Id. at 1379 (citing Ross, 48 So. 2d at 415). Moreover, the Mancini court noted that
“there is nothing in the language of the companion retraction provision, section 770.02,
that would limit the protection to the newspaper publisher . . . .” Id. at 1379.
The Mancini court stressed that its interpretation of the scope of section 770.01
“does not conflict with the series of cases holding the statute does not apply to ‘nonmedia defendants’ . . . [r]ather, the question is what is meant by ‘non-media defendant,’
14

a term not appearing within the statute, but only in case law.” Id. at 1380. The court
explained:
The use of the phrase “non-media defendant” in these cases
was not meant to distinguish between individuals and
corporations, but rather to separate third parties who are not
engaged in the dissemination of news and information
through the news and broadcast media from those who are
so engaged. In Davies the defendant, found to be a “nonmedia defendant,” was a private citizen who made the
alleged defamatory statements over an emergency channel
of a citizen’s band radio. In Bridges the court declined to
extend the reach of the statute to protect a private individual
whose allegedly libelous statement had been republished by
the newspaper. In Gifford the “non-media defendant” was
an aerial advertising firm being sued for a banner towed
overhead by airplane. Most recently, in [Tobkin] . . . we held
that the protection of section 770.01 did not cover individuals
who sent letters to The Florida Bar.
According to the Mancini court, the scope of section 770.01’s protection is defined by
separating third parties who are not engaged in the dissemination of news and
information “through the news and broadcast media” from those who are so engaged.
In Ortega Trujillo v. Banco Central Del Ecuador, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (S.D. Fla.
1998), Judge King sought to do just that. In Ortega Trujillo, the defendant—a publicrelations firm in the business of public relations and lobbying for its clients—sought
protection under section 770.01 for a press release it published that contained allegedly
defamatory statements.

Rejecting the defendant’s contention that it qualified as a

media defendant, Judge King explained that “[b]y definition, all news media
disseminates information, but it is a syllogism to conclude . . . that all those who
disseminate information automatically qualify as news media.” Id. at 1338.
Attempting to define the scope of “news media,” Judge King stated:
The function of the media is to inform and to initiate
“‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public
15

issues.” See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339,
94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (citing New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11
L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)).
Id. Judge King found that the defendant was in the business of public relations and
lobbying, and so could not fall within the definition of media, no matter how “nebulous”
that definition is. Id. In particular, the defendant “does not impartially disseminate
information. Nor, for that matter, does it issue unsolicited, disinterested and neutral
commentary as to matters of public interest, or editorialize as to matters of public
interest without being commissioned to do so by its clients.” Id.
Eventually, our courts were confronted with cases involving defamatory
statements made over the internet. In Zelinka, 763 So. 2d at 1173, the court had to
decide whether a plaintiff in a libel action arising out of a posting on an internet
“message board” was required to comply with the presuit notice requirements of section
770.01. Ultimately, the court held that the defendant was “a mere internet-using, private
individual,” and not a media defendant to which the presuit notice requirements apply.
Id.
The facts of Zelinka were as follows:
Respondents, Americare Healthscan, Inc., Americare
Diagnostics, Inc., and Dr. Joseph P. D'Angelo, filed a fourcount complaint against petitioner, Robert Zelinka, and other
defendants, alleging in counts I and II libel per se and libel
per quod based on the publication of allegedly false and
defamatory statements on an internet “message board.” The
complaint alleges that the board where the messages were
posted is maintained for the purpose of transmitting
information about Technical Chemicals and Products, Inc., a
corporation which was involved in litigation with the
respondents. Zelinka was not alleged to be the owner or
operator of the web site where the bulletin board was
located.
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Id. at 1174. The petitioner/defendant argued that the internet is an “other medium”
within the meaning of the statute, but the Zelinka court declined to reach that issue.
Rather, the court held that “[e]ven if an internet bulletin board was a ‘medium’ within the
scope of the statute, no precedent would allow this court to extend the statutory notice
requirement to a private individual who merely posts a message on the board.” Id. at
1175. The court characterized the petitioner/defendant in that case as being in “the
same position as that of the private individuals in the Davies, Bridges and Gifford cases,
whose statements were ‘broadcast’ to the public, but who themselves were not
members of ‘the media.’” Id. However, the Zelinka court did acknowledge, in dictum,
that “[i]t may well be that someone who maintains a web site and regularly publishes
internet ‘magazines’ on that site might be considered a ‘media defendant’ who would be
entitled to notice.” Id.
Such a defendant was found to be entitled to presuit notice in Alvi Armani
Medical, Inc. v. Hennessey, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2008).

In Alvi, the

defendant was the owner, host, and publisher of a website called the “Hair Restoration
Network,” which was identified as being “dedicated to providing information to the
consumer public about the hair restoration and transplant industry.” Id. at 1303-04. The
defendant claimed that the defamation suit should be dismissed because the plaintiffs
had failed to comply with section 770.01.

The defendant argued that “notice was

required in this case because the ‘other medium’ language used in section 770.01
includes the internet and internet forums such as the website at issue in this case.” Id.
at 1307. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that the “other medium” of section
770.01 was intended to include only television and radio broadcasting stations, and thus
no notice was required in their case. Id.
17

In deciding whether section 770.01 applied to the defendant, Judge Lenard first
acknowledged that “[w]hether the internet is included as part of the ‘other medium’
language . . . is an issue that has not been definitively resolved by the Supreme Court of
Florida . . . .” However, Judge Lenard found to be persuasive two Florida lower court
decisions, Canonico v. Calloway, 35 Med. L. Rptr. 1549 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 22, 2007),
and Holt v. Tampa Bay Television, Inc., 34 Med. L. Rptr. 1540, 1542 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar.
17, 2005), aff’d by 976 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). In Canonico, the trial court
dismissed the plaintiff’s defamation claim relating to statements made on the internet
because the plaintiff had not complied with section 770.01.

In Holt, the trial court

rejected the plaintiff’s contention that section 770.01 does not apply to stories published
on the internet, even by a media defendant.
Judge Lenard pointed out that “all of the cases cited by Plaintiffs in support of
their argument – with the exception of [Zelinka] – pre-date, by at least a decade, the use
of the internet by the general public, and do not directly address whether the internet is
considered in the category of ‘other medium’ as contemplated by section 770.01.” Id. at
1308. Judge Lenard further ruled that Zelinka was inapposite to the case because the
Alvi defendant was not a “private individual who merely posts a message on [an
internet] board.”

Id.

Rather, “Plaintiffs have brought suit against a company that

allegedly owns, hosts and publishes the offending website, which provides information
to the consumer public, and against the principal owner of that website, who is alleged
to control the website’s operations.” Id.
Most recently, in Five for Entertainment, S.A. v. Rodriguez, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1321
(S.D. Fla. 2012), a concert promoter sued the defendants, a Reggaeton musician
[“Daddy Yankee”] and his booking agency, for defamation resulting from a press release
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that the defendants posted on their respective websites.

Relying on Alvi, the

defendants argued that the publication of the allegedly defamatory statements on their
websites fell within the “other medium” language of section 770.01. Id. at 1326. In
response, the plaintiffs argued that section 770.01’s protection did not apply to the
defendants “simply because technology now enables those individuals to publish
information on the internet.” Id. at 1326-27.
When deciding the issue, Judge Seitz first pointed out that the parties’ arguments
had “unnecessarily confused the issue.” Id. at 1327. Judge Seitz said:
Whether the phrase “other medium” in § 770.01 includes the
internet is not the critical issue here, and, in this Court’s
view, not even open for debate. That the internet constitutes
a “other medium” for the purposes of § 770.01 should be
well-settled. See Alvi Armani, 629 F.Supp. 2d at 1307. If the
defendant in this case was the Miami Herald for example, it
would make no difference that the alleged statements were
found in the print or the online version of the paper. The
medium through which Defendants made the statements
then, is not dispositive here. Rather, the issue is whether
these Defendants are the type of parties contemplated to
receive pre-suit notice under § 770.01.
There is no dispute in Florida about who is entitled to receive
pre-suit notice under § 770.01.
Florida courts have
recognized that the statute does not apply to private parties
or nonmedia defendants. Bridges v. Williamson, 449 So. 2d
400, 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The Florida Supreme Court
has explained that one of the objectives of the statute was to
afford newspapers and periodicals an opportunity to make a
full retraction to correct errors and avoid exposure to punitive
damages. Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950).
Id. “Accordingly, § 770.01 does not extend to nonmedia defendants.” Id. With that
stated, Judge Seitz went on to rule on whether the defendants in the case were
“nonmedia” defendants, and thus not entitled to the protection of section 770.01.
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Ultimately, Judge Seitz found that the defendants were ”nonmedia” defendants.
Specifically, Judge Seitz made the following findings:
Turning to the Complaint, the Court finds no meaningful
allegations that the Defendants were engaged in the
dissemination of news and information. The Complaint
provides that Daddy Yankee posted a press release on his
personal website as well as Icaro’s, both of which are
available to the public. The Complaint provides no other
allegations concerning any other information disseminated
from the websites. For example, there is no indication that
the websites ever disseminated any other information,
whether it be traditional news or simply self-promotional or
“infomerical” materials. Assuming that the press release
constituted news, the one-time publication of that press
release does not render Daddy Yankee or Icaro members of
the news media. They are private parties with their own
websites who released information about the cancellation of
Daddy Yankee’s tour on one occasion. Finding that Daddy
Yankee and Icaro were media parties on these facts would
abolish any distinction between private parties and members
of the media.
Id.
With this emerging legal landscape in mind, we turn to the case here, where the
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of VanVoorhis because it determined that
the words “other medium” of section 770.01 were expansive enough to include the
internet and a blog, and that VanVoorhis’s blog falls under the rubric of “other medium.”
In support of this ruling, the trial court cited to the Alvi decision, which applied section
770.01 to a defendant who made defamatory statements on his website, where his
website was owned and operated for the purpose of providing consumer information on
the hair restoration and transplant industry. Comins argues that the trial court erred by
only considering whether the internet blog is a “medium” under section 770.01 and not
whether VanVoorhis is a “media defendant.”
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Important to the analysis here is the Ross court’s discussion of the legitimate
government interest in requiring presuit notice as a condition precedent under section
770.01. In support of its finding that the condition precedent was a valid exercise of the
legislature’s power, the court emphasized the need for the free dissemination of news
and fair comment thereon in order for the public to obtain as much information about a
particular event as possible before forming an opinion.

Not only did the court

emphasize the importance of the dissemination of facts, but it also emphasized the
importance of the dissemination of “fair comment” and “analytical criticism.” The court
said that “it is vital that no unreasonable restraints be placed upon the working news
reporter or the editorial writer.” Ross, 48 So. 2d at 415 (emphasis added).
In answering the question whether VanVoorhis’s blog and blog posts come within
the purview of the prescribed “other medium” entitled to presuit notice, we look to the
Ross decision to determine whether the blog is operated to further the free
dissemination of information or disinterested and neutral commentary or editorializing as
to matters of public interest. VanVoorhis contends that blogs like “Public Intellectual”
have “stepped into the void left by a shrinking print industry, and perform the same
important function – delivering news, information, and commentary to the masses.” On
the other hand, Comins characterizes VanVoorhis as merely an individual “writing from
his apartment under a pseudonym in between studying for his classes, [who] was under
no pressure whatsoever to deliver any information at all, much less to deliver it quickly.”
As early as 2005, Judge Posner discussed the changing face of news media
brought about by the internet:
The latest, and perhaps gravest, challenge to the journalistic
establishment is the blog. Journalists accuse bloggers of
having lowered standards. But their real concern is less
21

high-minded - it is the threat that bloggers, who are mostly
amateurs, pose to professional journalists and their principal
employers, the conventional news media. A serious
newspaper, like The Times, is a large, hierarchical
commercial enterprise that interposes layers of review,
revision and correction between the reporter and the
published report and that to finance its large staff depends
on advertising revenues and hence on the good will of
advertisers and (because advertising revenues depend to a
great extent on circulation) readers. These dependences
constrain a newspaper in a variety of ways. But in addition,
with its reputation heavily invested in accuracy, so that every
serious error is a potential scandal, a newspaper not only
has to delay publication of many stories to permit adequate
checking but also has to institute rules for avoiding error like requiring more than a single source for a story or limiting
its reporters' reliance on anonymous sources - that cost it
many scoops.
Blogs don't have these worries. Their only cost is the time of
the blogger, and that cost may actually be negative if the
blogger can use the publicity that he obtains from blogging to
generate lecture fees and book royalties. Having no staff, the
blogger is not expected to be accurate. Having no
advertisers (though this is changing), he has no reason to
pull his punches. And not needing a large circulation to cover
costs, he can target a segment of the reading public much
narrower than a newspaper or a television news channel
could aim for. He may even be able to pry that segment
away from the conventional media. Blogs pick off the
mainstream media's customers one by one, as it were.
And bloggers thus can specialize in particular topics to an
extent that few journalists employed by media companies
can, since the more that journalists specialized, the more of
them the company would have to hire in order to be able to
cover all bases. A newspaper will not hire a journalist for his
knowledge of old typewriters, but plenty of people in the
blogosphere have that esoteric knowledge, and it was they
who brought down Dan Rather. Similarly, not being
commercially constrained, a blogger can stick with and dig
into a story longer and deeper than the conventional media
dare to, lest their readers become bored. It was the bloggers'
dogged persistence in pursuing a story that the conventional
media had tired of that forced Trent Lott to resign as Senate
majority leader.
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What really sticks in the craw of conventional journalists is
that although individual blogs have no warrant of accuracy,
the blogosphere as a whole has a better error-correction
machinery than the conventional media do. The rapidity with
which vast masses of information are pooled and sifted
leaves the conventional media in the dust. Not only are there
millions of blogs, and thousands of bloggers who specialize,
but, what is more, readers post comments that augment the
blogs, and the information in those comments, as in the
blogs themselves, zips around blogland at the speed of
electronic transmission.
This means that corrections in blogs are also disseminated
virtually instantaneously, whereas when a member of the
mainstream media catches a mistake, it may take weeks to
communicate a retraction to the public. This is true not only
of newspaper retractions - usually printed inconspicuously
and in any event rarely read, because readers have
forgotten the article being corrected - but also of network
television news. It took CBS so long to acknowledge Dan
Rather's mistake because there are so many people
involved in the production and supervision of a program like
''60 Minutes II'' who have to be consulted.
Richard A. Posner, Bad News, N.Y. Times, July 31, 2005 (book review), at 1, 10.8
Agree or disagree with Judge Posner’s characterization of the travails of
“conventional media” and the virtues of blogs, it is hard to dispute that the advent of the
8

See also Mortgage-Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Industries, Inc.,
999 A.2d 184 (N.H. 2010), where the Supreme Court of New Hampshire was asked to
determine whether a company that operates a website that ranks various businesses in
the mortgage industry and allows visitors who register on the site and create usernames
to post publicly viewable comments about lenders, was a “news organization” entitled to
constitutional protection. In holding that Implode-Explode was a news organization
entitled to constitutional protection, the court explained:
Although our cases discussing the newsgathering privilege
have involved traditional news media, such as newspapers,
see, e.g., Keene Pub. Corp., 117 N.H. at 960, 380 A.2d 261,
we reject Mortgage Specialists' contention that the
newsgathering privilege is inapplicable here because
Implode is neither an established media entity nor engaged
in investigative reporting.
Id. at 189.
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internet as a medium and the emergence of the blog as a means of free dissemination
of news and public comment have been transformative. By some accounts, there are in
the range of 300 million blogs worldwide.9 The variety and quality of these are such that
the word “blog” itself is an evolving term and concept. The impact of blogs has been so
great that even terms traditionally well defined and understood in journalism are
changing as journalists increasingly employ the tools and techniques of bloggers – and
vice versa. In employing the word “blog,” we consider a site operated by a single
individual or a small group that has primarily an informational purpose, most commonly
in an area of special interest, knowledge or expertise of the blogger, and which usually
provides for public impact or feedback. In that sense, it appears clear that many blogs
and bloggers will fall within the broad reach of “media,” and, if accused of defamatory
statements, will qualify as a “media defendant” for purposes of Florida’s defamation law
as discussed above.
There are many outstanding blogs on particular topics, managed by persons of
exceptional expertise, to whom we look for the most immediate information on recent
developments and on whom we rely for informed explanations of the meaning of these
developments. Other blogs run the gamut of quality of expertise, explanation and evenhanded treatment of their subjects. We are not prepared to say that all blogs and all
bloggers would qualify for the protection of section 770.01, Florida Statutes, but we
conclude that VanVoorhis’s blog, at issue here, is within the ambit of the statute’s
protection as an alternative medium of news and public comment.

9

See Wikipedia, Blog, http://en.wikipedia/wiki/Blog (as of March 24, 2014, 15:29

GMT).
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The trial court properly determined that VanVoorhis was entitled to presuit notice
under section 770.01.

The presuit notice requirement of section 770.01 applies to

allegedly defamatory statements made in such a public medium the purpose of which is
the free dissemination of news or analytical comment on matters of public concern, as
suggested in Ross. The trial court correctly entered judgment in favor of VanVoorhis.
AFFIRMED.
LAWSON and COHEN, JJ., concur.
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